In this chapter, we consider the origin of uneven cognitive profiles in individuals with developmental disorders, including accounts from cognitive, brain, and genetic levels of description. We begin by introducing the main types of developmental disorder. We then discuss what is meant by the idea of modularity and the key issues surrounding it, outlining how modularity has been applied to explain deficits in developmental disorders. We illustrate competing theoretical positions by contrasting two developmental disorders, Williams syndrome (WS) and specific language impairment (SLI). In the first case, we consider cognitive deficits in WS with reference to modularity at a cognitive level and evidence from behavioral studies. In the second case, we consider SLI with reference to modularity at the neural level and evidence from brain imaging studies. We finish by considering the future for modular theories of atypical development, including the implication of recent findings from genetics and from computational modeling.
Introduction
When cognitive development goes wrong, the outcome can either be a child demonstrating global impairment across all cognitive abilities, or a child in whom some abilities are more impaired than others, thereby producing an uneven cognitive profi le . While an atypical learning environment can produce an uneven cognitive profi le-if you never encounter written text, you will have a selective disability in reading-uneven cognitive profi les can emerge across development even when the children are exposed to an apparently normal physical and social environment. Th e idea of modularity has been used to explain the origin of uneven cognitive profi les in developmental disorders. Th is proposal remains controversial for several reasons. Th ese include ongoing debates concerning when modular cognitive functions appear in development, how cognitive modules are implemented in the brain, and the extent to which genetic variation (implicated in many disorders) can plausibly aff ect only particular modular functions. In this chapter, we consider each of these questions in more detail. We fi rst introduce the main types of developmental disorder. We then discuss what is meant by the idea of modularity and the key issues surrounding it, outlining how modularity has been applied to developmental disorders. We next illustrate these theoretical positions by contrasting two developmental disorders, Williams syndrome and specifi c language impairment, the fi rst with reference to modularity at a cognitive level, the second with reference to modularity in the brain. We fi nish by considering the future for modular theories of atypical development.
modul arit y and developmental disorders Th e current state of our understanding regarding the genetic causes of such behaviorally defi ned disorders is as follows (see, e.g., Plomin, DeFries, McClearn, & McGuffi n, 2008) . Predominantly, the disorders are not caused by new genetic mutations but by versions of genes that are present and perhaps common in the normal population. Particular versions of such genes may carry an elevated risk for a given disorder (of, say, 0.5% per gene). Certain families accrue greater number of risk versions across generations, increasing the chance that off spring will develop the disorder (so, say, if you inherit the riskier versions of 100 of the genes, each contributing a risk of 0.5%, your chance of developing this disorder would be 50%). However, disorders are not all or none but vary on continua, with intermediate numbers of risk alleles associated with milder versions of the disorder. Even with a large number of the riskier versions of contributory genes, an environmental stressor may still be required to produce the full disorder, explaining why identical twins don't always both exhibit a given developmental disorder. Moreover, variations that carry a risk for one disorder might also carry a risk for another disorder (see, e.g., Vernes et al., 2008 , for a report of a variant carrying elevated risk for both autism and SLI, and Keller & Miller, 2006 , for discussion of the genetic causes of serious mental disorders). Th is state of aff airs has rendered it diffi cult to identify the genes that "cause" a given behavioral disorder because, for example, it may be diff erent genes contributing to the disorder in diff erent children, and gene versions on their own contribute little risk.
Modularity
Th e concept of modularity is inspired by the idea that a system can comprise a set of parts, each of which has a diff erent specialized function. Th e interaction between the specialized parts produces the behavior of the whole system. Th e idea of specialized components is familiar from designed artifacts (e.g., a bicycle has a frame, wheels, gears, a chain, handlebars, brakes, etc.). However, it is also an infl uential concept in biology (e.g., a body has arms and legs, there are specialized internal organs such as hearts and livers, and so forth). In 1983, the philosopher Jerry Fodor argued that the use of such specialized parts seemed to be a sensible way for a cognitive system to work (Fodor, 1983) . Moreover, he identifi ed a set of properties at least some of which he expected these "modules" to possess: modules would be specifi c to cognitive domains; they would work quickly, unconsciously, and been applied. Th ese can be broadly distinguished into two groups: disorders with a known genetic cause and disorders defi ned on behavioral grounds. In the fi rst group are disorders caused either by chromosomal abnormalities, missing genetic code, duplicated genetic code, or single gene mutations. Down syndrome (DS) is caused by three instead of the normal two copies of chromosome 21. Turner syndrome is a disorder where females are missing all or part of one of the normal two copies of the X chromosome. In Williams syndrome (WS), around 28 genes are missing from one copy of chromosome 7, while in Fragile X, a particular piece of genetic code has been repeated multiple times on one copy of the X chromosome. Phenylketonuria (PKU), associated with frontal cortex dysfunction, is caused by the mutation of a single gene on chromosome 12, while a mutation of the FOXP2 gene on chromosome 7 has been associated with a particular profi le of speech and language diffi culties in one British family. Th e majority of these disorders (DS, WS, Turner syndrome, Fragile X, untreated PKU) are associated with general learning disabilities and a low overall IQ. However, some of these disorders additionally show uneven cognitive profi les. For example, as we shall see, in WS language and face recognition are viewed as relative strengths, while visuospatial cognition is a relative weakness.
Some developmental disorders are identifi ed purely on behavioral grounds, where one or more cognitive abilities are failing to develop at age-appropriate levels. Th ese include dyslexia (problems with reading), autism (problems with social skills and communication, as well as stereotyped and repetitive behaviors), specifi c language impairment (SLI; problems with language development), dyscalculia (problems with acquiring numeracy skills), prosopagnosia (problems with recognizing faces), attention-defi cit/hyperactivity disorder (problems with sustained attention and behavioral control), and Tourette syndrome (problems with controlling behavioral initiation). Sometimes by virtue of their defi nition, these disorders entail that other cognitive abilities and indeed overall intelligence falls within the normal range, as assessed by standardized (intelligence) tests 1 . In most of these cases, risk for the disorder runs in families, implying that the disorder is at least partly of genetic origin. However, typically the genes have not yet been identifi ed (for disorders such as autism and dyslexia, this is an area of intense research, with candidate genes regularly being reported). thomas, purser, richardson As before, the idea is predicated on the assumption that the system has parts, and is formulated in terms of restricted causal scope 2 . In biology, the concept of modularity is used both for causal relations (e.g., protein-protein interactions, gene regulatory networks) and to summarize statistical relationships, such as traits that are observed to vary together in species versus those that vary independently (Wagner, Pavlicev, & Cheverud, 2007) .
When the idea of modularity is applied to psychology, there is an additional complication. Our current research paradigm views the study of the mind as intimately connected with the study of the brain. Modularity as originally conceived by Fodor involves the cognitive system, including domains such as perception, motor action, language, memory, and attention. Somehow these cognitive systems must be implemented in the brain. However, it is not clear whether the brain adheres to the same principles of modularity as the cognitive system (if indeed it does so at all). Does the brain have specialized parts? Do these line up with the specialized parts identifi ed in the cognitive system? Or do several specialized parts of the brain in concert produce cognitive-level modules?
Modularity and Development
If the cognitive system has specialized parts, where do they come from? One view is that the components are innate, already present in some primitive form in infancy. Th is view is typically associated with evolutionary psychology, where the components of the mind are considered to be the product of natural selection. Th e aim of evolutionary psychology is to explain psychological traits in terms of adaptations to ancestral environments (Buss, 2005) . Within this framework, the results of psychological adaptations are cognitive modules. Th e idea is to discover modules by reverse engineering (e.g., Pinker, 1997) . Th is is a means of discovering the design of a mechanism by considering the task that it performs. Evolutionary psychology uses this method in an attempt to reconstruct the mind by considering the adaptive challenges faced by our ancestors and then proposing the modules that evolved to meet them (see Cosmides & Tooby, 2008; .
Evolutionary psychologists have traditionally deemphasized development in favor of design , because design usually pertains to the endpoint of development. It is the behavior generated by the outcome of development that presumably leads the individual to have more or less off spring; the automatically; their computations would employ a dedicated knowledge base of facts about this specifi c cognitive domain; they would use dedicated neural architecture; they would be innate; and they would exhibit a characteristic pattern of breakdown (so that a restricted set of behaviors would be impaired when the module was damaged). Fodor conceived of these components as accounting for low-level perceptual and motor skills, in the manner of cognitive refl exes.
Th e concept of modularity has subsequently caused a great deal of debate (see, e.g., Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Coltheart, 1999; Fodor, 2000 Fodor, , 2005 Pinker, 2005) . In part, this is because Fodor's defi nition of a module constituted only a set of likely rather than necessary and suffi cient properties. It was therefore hard to test empirically: absence of a given property or dissociation of any two properties could not demonstrate that the idea of modularity was wrong. For instance, one might identify that fast unconscious processing can be found in a skill that is learned rather than innate, such as reading or driving a car. However, this would not falsify Fodor's claim that modules tend to be fast, unconscious, and innate, because the claim is only for a tendency of the association of these two properties. As such, modularity became more a way of talking about behavioral data rather than a falsifi able scientifi c hypothesis about how the cognitive system worked. Subsequently, several theorists sought to revise the notion of modularity, either emphasizing particular properties from the original set to pin down a concrete defi nition or to widen its scope of application. For example, Coltheart (1999) emphasized domain-specifi city as the key property, while Fodor (2000) emphasized the dedicated knowledge base that the module would use (sometimes called encapsulation of information), and Barrett and Kurzban (2006) focused on functional specialization. Some researchers argued that modularity wasn't only applicable to low-level cognitive processes, but that high-level cognitive skills could also be modular, an idea called "massive modularity" (see Fodor, 2000, for discussion) . Stressing the property of innateness, some researchers additionally viewed high-level modules as the product of natural selection, connecting modularity with evolutionary psychology (e.g., , 2008 Pinker, 1997) .
Within biology, a network of interactions within a system is called modular if it is subdivided into relatively autonomous, internally highly connected components (Wagner, Pavlicev, & Cheverud, 2007) . tuned to carry out processes relating to particular cognitive domains. Th e greater information fl ow around the system means that early in development, more components contribute to generating behavior. Depending on the environment to which the individual is exposed, the overall system organizes itself so that the components become highly tuned for particular functions, pruning away the over-connectivity and committing to a particular functional structure. Th is picture of emergent modularity is informed by recent theories on the origins of functional specialization in the cortex of the brain, such as Johnson's interactive specialization account (Johnson, 2005) .
A reconciliation between the evolutionary and developmental positions has been proposed that views natural selection as operating on developmental systems (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006) . Th at is, evolutionary causes are instantiated by genes and environments during the developmental process. In this view, the set of human modules fashioned by selection reliably emerge in individuals so long as the normal process of development takes place , which in turn depends on the child being raised in a normal environment. Th us, one might develop a specialized system for recognizing faces so long as one was exposed to a world containing lots of faces, but not otherwise. Under this view, evolution would have selected for the mechanisms that reliably lead to the development of a specialized face-recognition module when exposed to a world containing faces.
Modularity and Developmental Disorders
Th e mechanisms by which modular outcomes are delivered remain sketchy, particularly with regard to the way in which genetic causes serve to shape such outcomes. Th e detail is important, because we are faced with some puzzling questions. Here is a good example. By the time we are adults, many of us have acquired a specialized cognitive system for reading written text. Th is system can even be selectively damaged in adults who experience brain damage (e.g., Coltheart, 2001) . Some people experience problems in learning to read, and this developmental dyslexia can run in families. But how can one inherit a specifi c defi cit for reading, aff ecting no other cognitive abilities? Reading is a relatively recent cultural invention; there is insuffi cient time for this skill to have been the target of natural selection and for the design for a "reading module" to have been encoded on the human genome (and faults in that design passed down through families). If the genes that produce poor reading development behavior of the mature organism is therefore the target of natural selection. Th us adaptations are defi ned in terms of the outputs of an array of mature modules, each evolved to solve a particular problem. One well-known example of the evolutionary psychology approach is Cosmides and Tooby's (1992) hypothesis that there is an innate module that serves to detect cheating behavior . Th is is based on the notion that the evolution of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) , where individuals provide benefi ts to each other without expecting immediate recompense, would create the opportunity for cheats to prosper by accepting benefi ts without returning them. In evolutionary terms, there would be a selection advantage for cheating, to the cost of those expecting their altruism to be reciprocated. In turn, there would be a selection advantage for detecting cheaters and excluding them from social interactions.
Of course, one can have an evolutionary perspective without committing to a modular notion of cognition, instead shifting the emphasis to development. For example, Jay Belsky and colleagues (Belsky, 2005; Belsky, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007) argue that phenotypic plasticity can be an adaptation, given the uncertainty of the environment: this year's behavioral adaptation might be next year's disadvantage. Th erefore it can be advantageous to allow the environment to help optimize behavior. On this view, plasticity (or heightened sensitivity to the negative eff ects of poor environments and to the benefi cial eff ects of supportive environments) is partly innate, but an interaction of plasticity/susceptibility and environment determines the phenotypic outcome. Other related adaptations might include variation in amount or timing of myelination, amount of gray matter, gross brain weight, and cortical thickness-properties of the brain that increase the scope and capacity of cognitive development.
Other researchers accept modularity but view it as an outcome of the developmental process, rejecting the idea that the cognitive system starts out with preformed modules in respect of high-level cognition. Th is position, known as emergentism , views development as a process of experience-dependent self-organization (Elman et al., 1996; Karmiloff -Smith, 1992; Smith & Th elen, 2003) . Th e cognitive system begins with components with preferential inputs and outputs. Components may even have biases about the sorts of computations that they are more effi cient at performing. However, there is initially lots of cross-connectivity between components, and components are poorly thomas, purser, richardson explanation of the behavioral defi cits therefore involves identifying how the constraints on development have been altered by the disorder (Bishop, 1997; Karmiloff -Smith, 1997 Temple, 1997; Th omas, 2008; Th omas & Karmiloff -Smith, 2002) . In particular, any explanation of an uneven cognitive profi le in modular terms must answer two questions (Th omas, 2005b): (1) Why can't the normally developing modules compensate for the initially impaired module(s) across development, thereby attenuating the eff ects of the initial defi cits? (2) Since the normal development of modules involves interactions with other modules (if only to share information), why hasn't the initial impairment to one/some module(s) spread to other modules across development, thereby exaggerating the initial deficits? If answers to these questions have been omitted in a given proposal, then that proposal is incomplete, because it means we do not understand the details of the developmental account.
Four diff erent perspectives on the application of modularity to developmental disorders can currently be discerned. Th e fi rst view is that most developmental disorders can be characterized in terms of the normal set of high-level cognitive modules in individuals of equivalent age, but with one or more modules underdeveloped (or potentially, in the case of savant abilities, overdeveloped). Th is position places perhaps the least emphasis on development. For example, Temple (1997) off ered explanations for a range of developmental disorders (including dyslexia, prosopagnosia, and dyscalculia) with reference to modular theories of normal function originally conceived to explain intact and impaired performance in adults . On this account, behavioral defi cits correspond to focal impairments to selected modules. Although minimizing the role of development, theories of this type are nevertheless claimed to be inspired by behavioral observation. As Tager-Flusberg (2000) remarked, in most developmental disorders, there appear to be behaviors that look normal-at least, normal for the overall mental age of the individuals concerned. Th is leads to the inference that in most cases, the disorders are characterized by largely normal cognitive architectures, with individuals varying from the normal pattern in only certain circumscribed ways. However, much debate surrounds whether this behavioral observation is apparent or real. Moreover, if some behaviors are delayed in a disorder (i.e., at mental-age level rather than chronological-age level), it remains puzzling what the mechanistic cause of such delay could be.
are not genes for reading 3 , then why are other cognitive abilities not aff ected?
Modular explanations of developmental defi cits have, however, been widely deployed. Th ese accounts work as follows. If in a given disorder there is an uneven cognitive profi le, with some abilities scoring in the normal range but one (or more) showing deficits, then perhaps this is the result of one (or more) cognitive modules failing to develop properly, while the other modules follow the normal developmental pathway. In the case of reading, one might argue that a module that contributes to reading performance has not developed normally, while the rest of the cognitive system has nevertheless done so. If the developmental disorder is genetic (and we have seen that most have genetic contributions), then maybe the uneven profi le is due to genetic variation in the genes normally responsible for the development of the impaired module(s). Examples of this form of proposal include the idea that indeed, a module crucial for reading, in this case processing phonology, fails to develop properly in dyslexia (Frith, 1995) , the idea that a theory-of-mind module may fail to develop properly in autism (Leslie, 1992) , a module for syntax may fail to develop properly in some types of SLI (van der Lely, 2005) , and a module for editing intentions may fail to develop properly in Tourette syndrome (Baron-Cohen, 1998a) .
Th ere are a number of problems with the simplest application of the idea of modularity to apparent selective behavioral defi cits in developmental disorders. Th ese stem from the fact that development is an adaptive process, in which individuals are attempting to optimize their interactions with their physical and social environments. Behavioral impairments that emerge across development must therefore be construed in terms of the developmental process itself (Karmiloff -Smith, 1998) . Th is means that explanations of developmental defi cits should include several key concepts that characterize developmental theories (Th omas, 2005a) . Th ese include plasticity , that the cognitive system changes its structure in response to experience; interactivity , the idea that cognitive components interact with each other across development; redundancy , the idea that a given task can be accomplished equally adequately by more than one system; and compensation , the idea that certain behaviors can be delivered in diff erent ways (perhaps not as well) by alternative systems. In other words, in the case of a disorder, the cognitive system has a goal of developing adaptively, but the altered constraints on development mean that it is not successful. Th e appropriate may be overstated. Scores on some behavioral tests that fall in the normal range may mask subtle differences in the nature of the underlying cognitive processes. Th e focus of this approach is to use more sensitive measures of processing to probe areas of apparent strength in individuals who exhibit uneven cognitive profi les, as well as areas of weakness. Moreover, neuroconstructivists argue that uneven profi les may change over developmental time. For example, Paterson and colleagues (1999) reported that individuals with WS and DS showed diff erent respective abilities in language and numeracy in toddlers compared to adults. Toddlers with the two disorders showed no diff erence in a language task, but by adulthood, individuals with WS were superior to those with DS in language skills. Toddlers with WS were better at a numeracy task than toddlers with DS, but by adulthood, it was individuals with DS who showed stronger numeracy skills.
Let us summarize where we have reached thus far. We have encountered the idea of a modulebroadly a specialized functional component-and seen how it has been deployed by some researchers to explain the uneven cognitive profi les observed in some developmental disorders. However, we have seen that those disorders can be split into diff erent types (known genetic vs. behaviorally defi ned); we have seen that the notion of modularity has been used in diff erent ways by diff erent researchers; we have seen that for psychology, an additional problem arises of how cognitive modularity relates to brain modularity; and we have seen several competing theoretical stances that place diff erent degrees of emphasis on the involvement of developmental processes in producing the uneven cognitive profi les. In the next two sections, we work through two examples in greater detail, making contact with the behavioral and brain imaging data that have been used to advance our understanding of the respective disorders. Our fi rst example takes a known genetic disorder, WS, and examines modularity from a cognitive standpoint. Our second example takes a behaviorally defi ned disorder, SLI, and examines modularity from a brain standpoint.
Modularity and Disorders from a Cognitive
Perspective: Th e Example of WS WS is a rare developmental disorder, with a prevalence estimated to be around 1 in 20,000 (Morris, Dempsey, Leonard, Dilts, & Blackburn, 1988) . Th e disorder is associated with learning disability, with IQs usually falling in the range between 50 and 70. It is also associated with an uneven cognitive profi le.
A second position, called "minimalist innate modularity," accommodates a greater role for development. In this view, the modules observed in adults are built from smaller, more basic innate modules across development (Baron-Cohen, 1998b) . Where a selective defi cit is observed in an adult module, this may arise from the failure of one or more basic innate modules that contribute to its development. For instance, the proposed theory-of-mind module for reasoning about mental states may be constructed from lower-level systems for detecting eye gaze, for detecting emotions or intentions, or for sharing attention with others. Impairments in any of these low-level modules might cause developmental problems in learning to reason about other people's mental states, as for instance is observed in autism.
Th e third position is similar but argues that the low-level factors that contribute to impairments in the development of high-level skills are in fact more general than the domain in which they appear. It is the developmental process that creates the illusion of greater specifi city. As we will later see, there are proposals that high-level defi cits in grammar in SLI are caused by an initial defi cit in processing or maintaining information about speech sounds (Gathercole & Baddeley, 1990; Joanisse & Seidenberg, 1998) . Th is is because the speech sounds in question turn out to be key for carrying certain grammatical information in a sentence, producing higher-level defi cits in comprehending and producing sentences. Th ere are even more general accounts of SLI, for instance that its root cause may be a limitation in processing capacity (e.g., Bishop, 1994) or an underlying defi cit of the procedural memory system , which is particularly important for acquiring and performing skills that involve sequences (Ullman & Pierpoint, 2005) .
Th e fourth position places a still greater emphasis on development. Th is position is aligned with emergentism and is sometimes called neuroconstructivism (Karmiloff -Smith, 1998; Mareschal et al., 2007) . Th e "neuro" prefi x here refl ects a school of thought that argues that theories of cognitive development should be informed by the way the brain develops. Neuroconstructivism proposes that if modules are a product of development and development has gone wrong, it is unlikely that only one module will be impaired and that the rest will have developed normally (termed "residual normality"; see Th omas & Karmiloff - , for discussion). Th ese researchers are therefore more cautious about the nature of uneven cognitive profi les, and argue that the selectivity of some of these behavioral defi cits thomas, purser, richardson & Karmiloff - Smith, 2000) . Juxtaposing these two skills maximizes the unevenness of the profi le.
For disorders where there is a background of learning disability, one must be cautious with terminology. For a skill described as a relative strength in individuals with WS, this is in relation to their mental age (i.e., their general stage of developmental progression), not their chronological age. Few if any skills would be at the same level as a typically developing individual of the same chronological age. For example, a 12-year-old child with WS might have receptive vocabulary skills at the level of an 8-year-old but visuospatial skills of a 3-year-old. Claims of independent language and cognition in WS are often based on studies employing mental-age-matched controls, because this choice of control implicitly assumes a predictive relationship between language and cognition (Karmiloff - ). For our example child with WS, one might say his overall mental age is the average of his verbal and nonverbal abilities ([8 + 3] / 2 = 5.5 years) and remark that his verbal ability exceeds his overall mental age-yet his verbal ability is still 4 years behind chronological age expectations. As Karmiloff -Smith (1998) pointed out, the use of IQ scores can be particularly misleading with reference to language abilities. It may be striking to reveal that an individual has fl uent language despite an IQ of 50, but less so to say that an individual with a mental age of 6 has fl uent language; most typically developing 6-year-olds have fl uent language.
Special Language Abilities in WS?
Th ere is one often-cited aspect of WS language that has been used to assert particular communicative sophistication. Th e reported use of low-frequency words by individuals with WS is often used as evidence that language is special or precocious for people with the disorder (e.g., Bellugi et al., 1990; Bellugi, Wang, & Jernigan, 1994; Udwin & Dennis, 1995; see Th omas, Dockrell, Messer, Parmigiani, Ansari, & Karmiloff -Smith, 2006 , for a review). For instance, it is striking to hear an individual who is struggling to complete a simple puzzle talk of later going to visit his "associates" rather than his "friends." Th is use of unusual words was investigated by Th omas and colleagues (2006) with a speeded picture-naming task in order to assess whether such use resulted from an atypical criterion used to access lexical items for speech production. When we name pictures, people tend to take longer to produce low-frequency words than high-frequency words, and longer to name pictures Despite particular diffi culties with visuospatial and numerical cognition, language abilities appear less impaired in individuals with WS (Ansari, Donlan, Th omas, Ewing, Peen, & Karmiloff -Smith, 2003; Donnai & Karmiloff -Smith, 2000; Farran & Jarrold, 2003; Howlin, Davies, & Udwin, 1998) . Published fi ndings that language is a relative strength in WS (e.g., Bellugi et al., 1990; Bellugi, Lichtenberger, Jones, Lai, & St. George, 2000) have been interpreted by some researchers as evidence that people with WS have a language module that has developed normally. Th e disorder has therefore been used as evidence in support of the claim that language is modular in typically developing individuals (e.g., Anderson, 1998; Bellugi, Marks, Bihrle, & Sabo, 1988) .
For example, following initial investigations into WS, Pinker (1991, p. 534) wrote: "Although their IQ is measured at around 50, older children and adolescents with WS are described as hyperlinguistic with selective sparing of syntax, and grammatical abilities are close to normal in controlled testing. Th is is one of several kinds of dissociation in which language is preserved despite severe cognitive impairments, suggesting that the language system is autonomous of many other kinds of cognitive processing." A few years later, Pinker (1999) amplifi ed this modular view by contrasting WS with SLI, a disorder where language development is impaired but measures of nonverbal skills fall in the normal range. Pinker argued that WS and SLI together represent a "genetic double dissociation": if both are disorders of genetic origin, and the development of language and nonverbal cognition can be separately impaired, then perhaps the genes infl uencing the development of language and nonverbal cognition are independent.
Fifteen years of research into WS followed these early claims. In 2007, Brock published a review of the subsequent fi ndings into language capabilities in WS. He concluded that there is little compelling evidence that individuals with the disorder perform better on tests of syntax, morphology, phonology, or pragmatics than predicted by nonverbal measures. Th e unevenness of their cognitive profi le had been overstated. However, one explanation of this exaggeration was that there was one language skill where individuals with WS appeared particularly strong, receptive vocabulary (e.g., Bellugi et al., 1990; Brock, Jarrold, Farran, Laws, & Riby, 2007; Jarrold, Baddeley, & Hewes, 1999) , and one nonverbal skill where individuals with WS appeared particularly weak, visuospatial cognition (Donnai also fi nd it very hard to distinguish lies from jokes, tending to judge both as lies and justifying their interpretation simply by recounting the narrative, even when they demonstrated an understanding of second-order theory of mind and all the requisite knowledge for successful task performance (Sullivan, Winner, & Tager-Flusberg, 2003) .
One possibility, then, outlined by Th omas and colleagues (2010) is that individuals with WS might use fi gurative language as a kind of "frozen" vocabulary: each phrase is invariant and retrieved from memory rather than involving any kind of "online" process (Annaz, van Herwegen, Th omas, Fishman, Karmiloff -Smith, & Runbland, 2008) . Use of frozen language by people with WS might give rise to overestimations of language abilities by peers, teachers, and caregivers, in turn leading to people with WS facing language that they do not understand. Clearly, any diffi culty in understanding language would be highly likely to contribute to the social diffi culties experienced by children and adolescents with WS (e.g., Gosch & Pankau, 1997) . However, perhaps the most important reason to consider fi gurative language is that, far more than vocabulary, it captures something of day-to-day communication and seems a good representative of language as a whole.
Investigating Figurative Language in WS
Although traditionally viewed as unusual linguistic ornaments that complement literal language, recent research indicates that metaphor is common in everyday language (e.g., Graesser, Long, & Mio, 1989; Pollio, Barlow, Fine, & Pollio, 1977) . For instance, Graesser and colleagues (1989) found that speakers on television programs used approximately one unique metaphor for every 25 words uttered. Moreover, various strands of linguistic evidence suggest that metaphor is important for communicating about abstract concepts and may even be the only way of reasoning about them (e.g., Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) . Understanding metaphorical language involves profi ciency in both cognition and language, relying on several component abilities, including an understanding of communicative pragmatics, semantic knowledge processing capacity, and metalinguistic skill (see Vosniadou, 1987a Vosniadou, , 1987b .
To understand metaphor, for example, one must perceive a similarity between two terms, and also realize that those terms belong to diff erent conventional categories (e.g., Bowdle & Gentner, 2005) . Th erefore, an initial step in investigating children's of actions than objects. By measuring how quickly individuals with WS named pictures, it was possible to see whether frequency was encoded in the same way in their lexicons. Th e results indicated that frequency and semantic category eff ects were identical to those of a receptive vocabulary-matched control group. Where individuals with WS used rare words, this was not therefore due to a malfunction of their mental dictionaries. Instead, Th omas and colleagues suggested the use was deliberate, and that unusual words may be a social engagement device.
People with WS are sometimes described as having a hypersocial personality profi le (e.g., Gosch & Pankau, 1997; Jones, Bellugi, Lai, Chiles, Reilly, Lincoln, & Adolphs, 2000) and their conversational speech includes frequent pragmatic conversational devices in attempts to engage the attention of listeners (Reilly, Losh, Bellugi, & Wulfeck, 2004) . For example, one individual with WS said the following, while inventing a story to accompany a set of pictures: "And he said ' Hey , frogs! We're all together!' Th e end! Th at was great, wasn't it? " (engagement devices in italics). Although some individuals with WS are reported to make use of devices such as clich é s, idioms, and fi gurative language, this language is often misapplied or out of place in the particular social context (Bertrand, Mervis, Armstrong, & Ayers, 1994; Udwin & Yule, 1990) . Udwin and Yule (1990) found that around a third of a sample of 43 children with WS met the criteria for "cocktail party speech," characteristics of which include well-developed articulation, intonation, and stress patterns, but a poverty of communicative content and a tendency to relate irrelevant personal experiences, along with liberal use of stereotypical social phrases and conversational fi llers.
Th is inappropriate use of language may refl ect a poor underlying knowledge of its meaning. In support of this notion, a small study by Bertrand and colleagues (Bertrand, Mervis, Armstrong, & Ayers, 1994) showed that individuals with WS fi nd it very diffi cult to explain the meanings of proverbs and metaphors, with only 3 out of 14 participants able to provide an explanation for any of 12 test proverbs. Most participants' responses focused on surface elements of the proverbs without any reference to the fi gurative message. For example, responses to "Strike while the iron is hot" included "Don't touch it" and "Iron clothes." Performance was somewhat better for metaphors, with eight participants able to off er an explanation for at least one of seven metaphors; the highest number of metaphors explained was four. In a similar fashion, individuals with WS thomas, purser, richardson Th e results indicated that understanding of nonliteral similarity emerges in a similar way in individuals with WS as it does in typically developing individuals. However, there was an important group diff erence: while typically developing individuals expressed an emerging preference for functional similarity with increasing age (e.g., the sun is like an oven, rather than an orange), the WS group maintained a preference for the simpler perceptual similarity. Adult usage of fi gurative language tends to depend on more abstract types of nonliteral similarity (e.g., the metaphor "boiling mad" does not mean hot but about to explode into action). Th e results of this study are consistent with the notion that where individuals with WS do use adult fi gurative language, they may do so without fully understanding the abstract mappings that underpin it (cf. Bertrand et al., 1994) .
Th omas and colleagues sought to investigate further the nature of any disparity between language use and underlying knowledge in WS. Th is time, Purser, Th omas, Snoxall, and Mareschal (2009) investigated lexical semantic knowledge using a task where individuals were asked to sort animals into semantic categories. Th e particular concern was to tap underlying knowledge while avoiding the metacognitive demands inherent in the more usual defi nitions task. If one asks an individual to defi ne the word "elephant," the implicit request is to list the salient and diagnostic features of the category "elephant" in decreasing order of salience and diagnosticity-a fairly challenging task. By contrast, the individual may know that elephant and zebra should be grouped together, and horse and cow should be grouped together, which would indicate underlying knowledge of typical habitat. Individuals were given both an animal sorting task and a defi nitions task to compare performance. Focusing on the domain of animals gave the individuals with WS the best chance to succeed, since individuals with WS as young as 10 have been shown to have unimpaired basic knowledge in this area relative to verbal mental-age-matched controls (Johnson & Carey, 1998) .
Analyzing the trajectories of development, the performance of a group of adolescents and adults with WS on the defi nitions task began as if it were in line with their verbal mental age (as measured by a receptive vocabulary task). However, with increasing verbal ability, the typically developing group improved more steeply than the WS group. In the categorization task, the WS group's performance developed at a similar rate to that of ability to understand metaphor at a given stage in development is to assess their ability to understand nonliteral similarity statements, which necessitates knowing that items falling in diff erent semantic or conceptual categories can nevertheless be similar in some sense.
Th omas and colleagues (2010) administered a simple picture-based categorization task to children and adults with WS, typically developing children aged between 4 and 11, and typically developing adults. Th e study employed a developmental trajectories approach, in which a function is constructed linking task performance to changes in verbal mental age (see Th omas, Annaz, Ansari, Scerif, Jarrold, & Karmiloff -Smith, 2009 ). Th is permits developmental change to be compared across the typically and atypically developing groups. A key benefi t of employing trajectories that link performance on a task to a mental-age measure is that they can be used to examine whether that performance is commensurate with the developmental state of other measures of cognitive ability. One asks: Is ability X where you would expect it to be, given the developmental state of the rest of the cognitive system, even if ability X is not at age-appropriate levels?
In this categorization task, both perceptual and functional nonliteral similarity were investigated. Nonliteral similarity is similarity that crosses category boundaries: the sun and an orange are diff erent things, but both are of similar shape and color. Th e ability to understand nonliteral similarity is a key component of using fi gurative language (e.g., "the sun is an orange in the sky"). In a paradigm adapted from Vosniadou and Ortony (1983) , participants were required to complete comparison statements and categorization statements (e.g., "Th e sun is like . . . ?" or "Th e sun is the same kind of thing as . . . ?") by choosing one of two words. Th e pairs of words were formed from items that were literally, perceptually, or functionally similar to the target word, or else anomalous (e.g., "moon," "orange," "oven," or "chair," respectively). Justifi cations of responses were also recorded to gain an insight into how participants selected their responses. Th e logic of the study (after Vosniadou & Ortony, 1983) was that selecting literally similar pairs in the categorization task was evidence of category knowledge (e.g., the sun is the same kind of thing as the moon, rather than an orange). Selecting perceptually or functionally similar items in the comparison task was evidence of nonliteral similarity (e.g., the sun is like an orange, rather than the moon).
Fractionation
We have reviewed a line of investigation into whether the language system as a whole develops normally in WS, against a background of poor nonverbal (and particularly visuospatial) cognition. Is WS a case where the module of language develops normally? Th e answer appears to be no. In this section, we consider whether more fi ne-grained selective defi cits can be found within the language or cognitive systems of individuals with WS, and whether these defi cits can inform theories of how the normal systems are structured. Can WS "fractionate" cognition?
Taking language ability to start with, the fi rst problem that is encountered is that as performance is examined at fi ner levels of detail, fractionations appear within those fi ner levels. For example, Grant, Valian, and Karmiloff -Smith (2002) investigated productive grammar in WS, and found that although syntax was generally in line with overall level of cognitive functioning, their participants with WS performed worse than typically developing children when required to repeat sentences with complex relative clauses, often simplifying the sentence structure by omitting a verb or verb phrase, or an entire clause. Th is was despite the fact that the WS group had a higher mean verbal mental age than the typically developing participants. Should one conclude from this that people with WS have an impaired complex relative clause module within the syntax module?
If the answer is no-because the number of modules we have to postulate risks becoming so large-how should this level of fractionation be explained? Neuroconstructivists have attempted to off er an account (Karmiloff -Smith, 1998; Mareschal et al., 2007) . Th omas (2006) used an example from outside the domain of language, that of face recognition, to illustrate how neuroconstructivism might explain fi ne-grained cognitive fractionations. Recognizing faces is another area in which people with WS show a relative strength, performing better than would be predicted by most other measures of cognition and even scoring at chronological-age levels in some tasks. One might view this as part of the hypersocial personality profi le observed in this syndrome. Individuals with WS tend to be very interested in faces from an early age . Th us, people with WS are likely to be widely exposed to faces, and fi nd it more intrinsically rewarding than usual to recognize faces and engage with people. the typically developing group, but was markedly poorer on average than predicted by verbal mental age. Th is pattern of results indicated two things. First, the task of defi ning animals was indeed hard for the individuals with WS, particularly at the more sophisticated levels expected of older individuals (cf. Benelli et al., 1988) . Second, as assessed by the sorting task, individuals with WS have poorer lexical semantic knowledge than expected given their level of receptive vocabulary, a skill for which this population is noted. Despite the disparity in absolute level, semantic knowledge, indexed by categorization task performance, develops at a similar rate to that found in typical development. Taking the results of the Th omas and colleagues and Purser and colleagues studies together, it can be seen that apparent linguistic competence in WS does not necessarily refl ect normally developing underlying processes. Th e hypersocial personality profi le of people with WS, along with good vocabulary learning ability, appears able to overcome weaker aspects of cognition and language to give an appearance, at least in some cases, of relatively advanced language skills, illustrated by the presence of rare words and fi gurative language in their speech.
A fi nal point to emphasize in relation to fi gurative language comprehension is that understanding nonliteral or abstract relations is but one necessary part of real-world fi gurative comprehension; another is to interpret the intention of the speaker, recognizing that the statement is not intended to be taken literally. As outlined above, Bertrand and colleagues (1994) asked participants with WS to explain metaphors, and those participants tended to focus on surface features. A range of conservation tasks was also administered, testing conceptual understanding of the physical properties of the world: of the fi ve participants who demonstrated any understanding of conservation, four also performed above chance on the fi gurative language tasks. Bertrand and colleagues pointed out that, like conservation tasks, the successful comprehension of fi gurative language involves integrating several sources of information (words, intonation, context, gesture), and the ability to integrate different sources of information appears to cut across both cognitive and language domains. Th is serves to illustrate that notions of monolithically preserved language are likely to be misguided, simply because language involves so many components of ability, only some of which are likely to be unique to that system. thomas, purser, richardson specifi c defi cits to specialized cognitive apparatus, it could be that diffi culties lie at a level of processes shared by diff erent cognitive specializations. As Barrett and Kurzban (2006, p. 637 ) comment, "it seems uncontentious that some computational resources are shared by multiple systems and that the use of such a shared resource at a given time precludes its simultaneous use by another. Arguments about modularity do not turn on this feature of cognition." Our fi nal example from WS contrasts short-term memory ability with that found in DS. Once again, this is a domain in which early reports talked in terms of dissociations between specialized abilities.
Although the evidence for relatively strong language in individuals with WS has proved mixed, it is certainly clear that these individuals have a marked diffi culty in visuospatial cognition (e.g., Farran & Jarrold, 2003) . In this sense, DS off ers an interesting contrast. Th e language abilities of individuals with DS are more impaired than their nonverbal skills, relative to their general level of cognitive functioning (e.g., Chapman, 1995; Fowler, 1990) . Th e short-term memory abilities of each disorder appear to echo their diff erent profi les of verbal and nonverbal abilities. Wang and Bellugi (1994) directly compared verbal and visuospatial short-term memory abilities in WS and DS with digit span and Corsi span tasks. In the digit span task, a list of numbers must be repeated back by the participant in the correct serial order, with lists increasing in length. Th e Corsi span task is analogous but uses the visuospatial domain. Participants watch an experimenter tap out a sequence of spatial locations across a board of pegs, then attempt to reproduce that sequence (Corsi, 1972 , cited in Milner, 1971 ). Wang and Bellugi found that individuals with DS showed signifi cantly poorer digit recall than individuals with WS, but reliably better performance on the Corsi task. Th e authors argued that this double dissociation constitutes neurogenetic evidence for two diff erent cognitive systems, one specialized for short-term storage of verbal information, one specialized for short-term storage of visuospatial information. It should be noted, in passing, that the logic of double dissociation evidence is not straightforwardly extended to developmental disorders, for several reasons. For example, performance differences at one point in development do not imply that a stable double dissociation will be found at a later or earlier point (Karmiloff -Smith, Scerif, & Ansari, 2003; see Dunn & Kirsner, 2003 , for wider discussion).
One could interpret the relative strength in recognizing faces as evidence that a face-processing module has been developing normally in this disorder (e.g., Bellugi, Wang, & Jernigan, 1994) . However, research has shown that face recognition in WS doesn't work in quite the same way. Highly skilled face recognition in typical development involves a reliance on recognizing combinations of facial features and their exact arrangement in the face. In WS, however, skilled recognition is delivered by processing that relies more on individual facial features, such as the eyes or the mouth, rather than confi gurations of features Karmiloff -Smith, 1997; Deruelle et al., 1999; though see Tager-Flusberg, Boshart, & Baron-Cohen, 1998) . Indeed, the ability of individuals with WS to process confi gurations of features might be as weak as their general ability to process visuospatial information (Karmiloff -Smith et al., 2004) .
How does one reconcile the strengths and the weaknesses? Th omas (2006) gives the following possible neuroconstructivist account: genetic eff ects during brain development in WS generate initial cortical structures with diff erent neurocomputational properties from the corresponding structures in typically developing individuals. Although overall processing is poorer, these neural structures are better able to process isolated featural information than confi gurations. Th e atypical visuospatial system is exposed to many faces via a socioemotional reward mechanism operating in a (functionally) separate brain structure. Th e visuospatial system subsequently develops atypically, but the system is able to perform acceptably because many faces can be identifi ed on the basis of individual features and because faces are a very common stimulus. However, the system cannot develop the same neural organization, specialization, and localization that the system would typically possess for a given level of proficiency in face processing. A lot of practice enables a suboptimal system to reach performance in the normal range on a standardized test that is relatively insensitive to the way that this performance is being achieved.
Modularity and Shared Resources
Th e situation we have considered so far is that individual modules might develop atypically while others develop normally. However, there are more sophisticated ways that modular theories might accommodate uneven cognitive profi les. For example, instead of uneven profi les arising purely from Shallice, McLeod, and Lewis (1985) showed that there is relatively little interference between detecting a name in a stream of words (processing input phonology) and reading aloud (processing output phonology), but there is severe interference between shadowing one stream of words while detecting a name in another (each of which requires processing input phonology).
Th e evidence outlined above could be interpreted in a framework in which speech production and digit span require some common sequencing process . One clear link between expressive language and verbal short-term memory is that both rely on the ability to successfully sequence verbal material. Purser and Jarrold (2005) , using a modifi ed verbal probed recall task, found that individuals with DS performed signifi cantly worse than typically developing controls in a task where both item and order memory were necessary to aff ord good recall. However, when only item memory was required, the two groups performed similarly. Th is suggests that, to the extent that individuals with DS have a verbal short-term memory defi cit, it might be a dysfunction of order memory. In support of this idea, Brock and Jarrold (2004) showed that individuals with DS performed worse on short-term verbal order memory task than predicted by their performance on a test of phonological item memory.
WS: Implications for Modularity
Th e take-home message from this work at the cognitive level is that although we may begin by identifying broad patterns of cognitive strengths and weaknesses in a disorder and formulating a simple explanation in terms of typically and atypically developing modules, the picture that emerges from more detailed research is more complex in at least three ways. Th e pattern of behavioral fractionation turns out to be much more fi ne-grained than whole cognitive domains; performance in the normal range may be generated by highly practiced skills that nevertheless rely on atypical underlying cognitive processes; and apparently selective impairments may arise from reliance on (impaired) resources that are shared across some but not all cognitive processes.
Modularity and Disorders from a Brain Perspective: Th e Example of Specifi c Language Impairment
In contrast to WS, SLI is a behaviorally defi ned developmental disorder. As the name suggests, the language abilities of children with SLI are Several other studies have shown that individuals with DS have either superior (Jarrold & Baddeley, 1997; Jarrold, Baddeley, & Phillips, 2002; Laws, 2002) or similar (Brock & Jarrold, 2005; Jarrold, Baddeley, & Hewes, 1999; Numminen, Service, Ahonen, & Ruoppila, 2001 ) Corsi spans relative to matched control participants, while demonstrating relatively poorer digit spans (although see Seung & Chapman, 2000; Vicari, Carlesimo, & Caltagirone, 1995) . Jarrold and colleagues (1999) also replicated the above fi nding that individuals with WS are impaired in Corsi recall, but not digit span, relative to learning-disabled controls. However, among other caveats, Jarrold and colleagues pointed out that, rather than necessarily showing specifi c short-term memory defi cits , the pattern of results could refl ect more general verbal processing problems in DS, or visuospatial processing diffi culties in WS. As we saw with face processing, good task performance cannot necessarily be taken as evidence of a normally functioning system. Th e related point here is that poor performance on a given task cannot prima facie be taken as evidence of dysfunction of the systems primarily ascribed to aff ord good task performance for that task (in this case, short-term memory systems). Instead, analysis of task demands can suggest that, rather than specifi c defi cits of specialized cognitive apparatus, diffi culties could lie at a level of processes shared by diff erent cognitive specializations. For example, Brock and Jarrold (2005) suggested that a common mechanism might underlie both poor verbal short-term memory and speech production diffi culties in DS. In typical development, there is evidence from neuroimaging studies indicating that both serial recall and speech production rely on the same cortical areas (see Gupta & MacWhinney, 1997) . Furthermore, errors in speech production have been successfully modeled by computational models of serial memory (Vousden, Brown, & Harley, 2000) .
In contrast to Baddeley's (1986) working memory model, several researchers have formulated models in which verbal short-term memory is not distinct from language systems, but instead refl ects the transient storage of linguistic representations. For example, Monsell (1987) has presented a number of logically possible relations between speech input and output pathways and argued that verbal short-term memory data require the existence of two phonological buff ers, possibly located in these separate speech input and output pathways. Evidence from typical development supports this notion: thomas, purser, richardson Th eories regarding the potential cause(s) of SLI at the cognitive level are predominantly domain-specifi c, focusing on a root defi cit in a particular processing system. Grammar-specifi c hypotheses are a particularly prevalent feature of the literature to the extent that a grammar-specifi c subtype of SLI known as grammatical or G-SLI has been reported (van der Lely, 2005; van der Lely & Christian, 2000) , and theories have been put forward regarding the nature of the faulty component. For example, van der Lely (2005) proposed the Computational Grammatical Complexity Hypothesis; Rice (2000) put forward the Extended Optional Infi nitive Account, in which children with SLI are claimed to have a delayed and protracted period of grammatical development. Once more, these grammar-specifi c hypotheses are predicated on certain assumptions about how development works-in this case, that a grammar-specifi c processing module exists at the onset of language development, and that this module develops independently from other components of the language system.
Other domain-specifi c accounts suggest that SLI may be caused by a defi cit in phonological processing-for instance, an impairment in phonological short-term memory (Gathercole & Baddeley, 1990) or phonological discrimination (Joanisse & Seidenberg, 1998) . Diffi culty in processing basic units of speech known as phonemes results in a degraded representation of initial speech information. Th e behavioral profi le of SLI emerges as a result of the degraded quality of this phonological information upon which subsequent components of the language network (such as the semantic system and grammatical processing) rely.
Conversely, there are also theories of SLI that propose that the behavioral profi le of the disorder is caused by a general rather than a specifi c processing defi cit-for instance, a limitation in processing capacity (Bishop, 1994; Ellis Weismer et al., 1996 , or an underlying defi cit of the procedural memory system, which is particularly important for acquiring and performing skills that involve sequences (Ullman & Pierpoint, 2005 ; see Th omas, 2005b, for discussion). Th ese theories suggest that the root cause of SLI is not domain-specifi c, aff ecting predominantly a single processing module independently of others, but either has a more general impact across multiple processing modules or requires an account that avoids the notion of modules altogether. Specifi c impairments appear in those areas that rely on a particular sort of information particularly aff ected. Despite having a nonverbal IQ within the normal range, children with SLI exhibit particular diffi culties in the acquisition of grammar. Th ese children also have poor phonological skills, and may also have poor semantic knowledge, and vocabulary (Van der Lely, 2005; Webster & Shevell, 2004) . Th ese diffi culties also result in children with SLI experiencing problems learning to read, write, and spell, and in some cases aff ect their ability to learn mathematical skills such as performing arithmetic (Cowan, Donlan, Newton, & Lloyd, 2005) . Although SLI is considered to be a disorder of language, it is also sometimes accompanied by nonlinguistic defi cits, which include problems with working memory, impairments in motor skills that require sequencing, timing, and balance (Hill, 2001) , and sequential auditory processing (Hill, Hogben & Bishop, 2005; McArthur & Bishop; . Th is profi le of linguistic and nonlinguistic defi cits in SLI is highly variable and diff ers from child to child, so that SLI is usually characterized as a heterogeneous disorder. Although young children with SLI do go on to develop functionally complex language, pervasive underlying diffi culties may still be detected through the use of cognitive tasks such as nonword repetition, where prior knowledge cannot be called upon to compensate for the linguistic defi cit (Newbury, Bishop, & Monaco, 2005) .
While SLI does not have a clearly defi ned genetic basis, its heritability attests to genetic involvement (Smith, 2007) . Th e familial link with SLI has infl uenced research, with studies investigating diff erences in brain structure that are common to children with SLI and their families (Clark & Plante, 1998; Jackson & Plante, 1996; Plante et al., 1991) . In recent years genetic researchers have begun the search for potential candidate genes that may contribute to the SLI phenotype (behavioral profi le). Th ese studies have used nonword repetition-a task that children with SLI fi nd particularly diffi cult-as a phenotypic marker for identifying chromosomal anomalies associated with language impairment (Newbury, Bishop, & Monaco, 2005; SLI Consortium, 2002 , 2004 Stromswold, 1998 Stromswold, , 2001 . Furthermore, previous studies of a British family in whom a single genetic mutation appeared to produce speech and language defi cits supports the notion that there may also be a genetic link for SLI; in the KE family, as they are known, members inheriting the mutated FOXP2 gene exhibit a marked expressive language and articulation disorder (Lai, Fisher, Husrt, Vargha-Khadem, & Monaco, 2001) . temporal brain regions (e.g., Friederici et al., 2003; Humphries et al., 2005) . Furthermore, the inferior frontal gyrus is activated by tasks that do not involve syntactic processing (e.g., Wagner et al., 2001 ). On the basis of this evidence, the syntactic processing system is likely to consist of a network of inferior frontal and temporal regions, which may also be engaged in other tasks, and whose involvement is unlikely to represent dedicated neural architecture. Th is brain-based description of the syntactic system violates the cognitive concept of modularity in two ways. Multiple brain regions are typically engaged in a specifi c cognitive task, and each region is frequently involved in multiple tasks .
In the following section we summarize current fi ndings regarding the brain basis of SLI. We then follow by considering how these fi ndings fi t within a modular perspective in reference to potential underlying causes of the disorder.
Th e Brain Basis of SLI
As the brain is the substrate of cognition, the assumption is that deviations from typical cognitive ability may be due to underlying structural diff erences in brain anatomy, and/or functional differences in processing information. Th erefore, a disorder may be characterized in terms of diff erences in brain structure or function in comparison to the typical population. Diff erences in brain structure can be examined through postmortem examinations, or through the analysis of detailed anatomical images such as those taken in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanners. Structural diff erences may include cellular abnormalities, cortical malformations, diff erences in brain volume, or diff erences in the composition of brain tissue. Diff erences in brain function require recordings of task-related activity, for instance taking images of brain activity using an MRI scanner when an individual is carrying out a specifi c task such as listening to speech or reading words presented on a screen. In the context of disorders, functional diff erences may take the form of over-or under-activation of the same brain regions used to perform the task by the typical population, or the activation of one or more diff erent brain regions not used by the typical population while performing the same task. In this subsection we summarize present structural and functional diff erences detected in imaging studies of SLI.
Structural Diff erences
Structural studies of SLI have revealed less pronounced diff erences in comparison to structural (phonological) or process (sequencing) that has developed atypically.
Proposals for the causes of SLI at the cognitive level are in advance of our understanding of the processing systems and regions aff ected at the neurological level. Th e Procedural Defi cit Hypothesis (PDH) does attempt to identify the brain regions that may be aff ected in SLI (Ullman & Pierpoint, 2005) . Th ese regions include the caudate nucleus (part of the basal ganglia), the temporal cortices, Broca's area, and the cerebellum, which are associated with a range of cognitive processes, such as working memory, language, rapid temporal processing, and dynamic mental imagery. According to the PDH hypothesis, the profi le of impairment in SLI for any given child is dependent upon how severely these regions are aff ected, and how eff ectively the declarative memory system is able to compensate for the defective procedural system.
In this section we begin by considering how modules may be represented at the brain level. We then summarize recent studies investigating the brain basis of SLI, and discuss how atypical brain structure and function may explain diff erent aspects of the behavioral profi le of the disorder and provide an indication as to the potential cause(s). We also provide an example of how functional diff erences may be tested within a cognitively motivated theoretical framework using brain imaging. Finally, we discuss the implications of current diff erences in brain structure and function in SLI in terms of the broader modular perspective.
Th e Concept of Modularity at the Brain Level
If one were to adopt a literal view of how modularity might apply at the brain level, one might hypothesise that a domain-specifi c processing system would be localized within a single anatomically defi ned brain region. Th is is perhaps most clearly illustrated within classic cognitive neuropsychology, where damage to Broca's area (inferior frontal gyrus) causes a defi cit in speech production, while damage to Wernicke's area (posterior region of the superior temporal cortex) causes a defi cit in speech comprehension (Goodglass, 1993) . Perhaps these regions house modules for production and comprehension, respectively. However, our current understanding of functional anatomy reveals a more complex picture. For example, while syntactic processing frequently engages the inferior frontal gyrus (Caplan et al., 1999 (Caplan et al., , 2001 Cooke et al., 2001) , functional studies have also indicated the involvement of thomas, purser, richardson of gyral patterns) that was more common in families with a history of SLI. An investigation of the inferior frontal gyrus (Clark & Plante, 1998 ) also found diff erences in patterns of morphology associated with a familial history of SLI. Aff ected individuals were more likely to have an extra sulcus in this region. Th is latter fi nding is consistent with an earlier postmortem investigation identifying polymicrogyra (small-scale structural malformations) in the brain of a child with SLI (Cohen et al., 1989) .
Th ese anatomical studies have provided an indication as to the cortical regions that may be aff ected. However, there are limitations associated with the methodology adopted by these studies. Most notably, these studies typically focus on particular brain regions selected in advance of examining the brain structure of individuals with SLI. Th e regions are selected as those likely to be aff ected by the disorder, for example only regions most commonly associated with language processing such as inferior frontal and temporal areas. As a consequence, there may be other regions outside these areas that also show anatomical diff erences yet remain undetected. A further disadvantage is that these broad regional studies do not provide a precise localization of these diff erences in the brain.
Th e introduction of a statistical analysis technique called voxel-based morphometry (VBM; Ashburner & Friston, 2000) for the analysis of structural brain images provides a more precise localization of diff erences between atypical and typical populations. Th is technique can be used to compare the brains of controls and disorder groups in order to identify precise locations where there is a diff erence between the two groups in the amount of gray or white matter (brain cells and connectivity, respectively). A recent study carried out by Soriano-Mas and colleagues (in press) using VBM investigated diff erences in gray and white matter volume in younger (5 to 11 years) and older (up to 17 years of age) children with SLI in comparison to controls. Th is study found that the overall amount of gray and white matter in young children with SLI was higher in comparison to controls. Overall, children with SLI had increased gray matter volume in the right perisylvian region of the left middle occipital gyrus. More diff erences were observed in younger children with SLI, in which several regions showing an increase of gray matter were detected. Th ese areas included the entorhinal area, the temporopolar cortex, the caudate nucleus, the motor/precentral cortex, and the precuneus of the left hemisphere. Areas of white matter increase were also observed in these children, located in the studies of disorders such as WS (Th ompson et al., 2005) . However, the structural investigation of SLI has been limited in approach, with structural studies of SLI typically involving taking measurements of the size of diff erent brain regions from detailed anatomical scans acquired through MRI. Th ese studies have detected several features of the SLI brain that diff er from those usually seen in normal development. Th e most consistently occurring fi nding is increased symmetry of the planum temporale . Th is area is an area located posterior to Heschl's gyrus encompassing superior temporal regions and is associated with the temporal processing of speech sounds and acoustic information (Griffi ths & Warren, 2002) , and it is normally observed to be larger on the left than the right side of the brain. Th ese fi ndings are consistent with an earlier postmortem study carried out by Cohen et al. (1989) on the brain of a child diagnosed as having SLI. However, the fi nding has not been consistently replicated (De Foss é et al., 2004; Preis et al., 1998) , and diff erences in fi ndings may in part be due to discrepancies in how the region of the planum temporale is anatomically defi ned, as well as diff erences in age and handedness of subjects, which can infl uence planum asymmetry (Eckert & Leonard, 2000) . Increased variability in the asymmetry of the planum temporale is consistent with postmortem studies of developmental dyslexia (Galaburda, Kemper, et al., 1979; Galaburda et al., 1985; Humphreys et al., 1990) , although here again, subsequent studies have not been entirely consistent in terms of the direction of the diff erence (Eckert & Leonard, 2000) .
Other anatomical diff erences detected in SLI include abnormal patterns of asymmetry and symmetry in prefrontal and parietal cortex (Jernigan et al., 1991) ; a smaller pars triangularis (an inferior frontal region) and a narrower right hemisphere (Gauger et al., 1997) ; a smaller left Heschl's gyrus-an auditory processing region in the temporal lobes (Leonard et al., 2002) ; reduced total brain volume (Preis et al., 1998) ; and diff erences in cortical morphology in the form of gyral patterns (Clarke & Plante, 1998; Jackson & Plante, 1996) . Regarding the last of these, gyral patterns in the brain are defi ned prenatally, which may bring researchers closer to a genetic link. In their evaluation of morphological patterns of the perisylvian language regions in the brains of parents of children with SLI and children with SLI in comparison to controls, Jackson and Plante (1996) found one particular pattern (out of four possible classifi cations Th e second study, carried out by Ellis Weismer and colleagues (2005) , investigated language and working memory processing in a group of adolescents with SLI. Th e task performed by participants involved an encoding task during which they listened to sentences, and a recognition task using fi nal words from previously presented sentences. Th e results of this study also demonstrated that adolescents with SLI activated the same language regions in the left hemisphere as controls, but tended to show reduced activation in some of these regions. Specifi cally, hypoactivation was observed in the parietal region and the precentral sulcus during the encoding task and in the inferior frontal gyrus during the recognition task. Additional analysis carried out in this study also indicated that the coordination of activation of these brain regions during the recognition process was diff erent from that observed in controls.
In sum, although the number of functional studies investigating SLI is limited, the two published studies show convergence. Individuals with SLI appear to activate the same language regions in the left hemisphere , but within this network, show regions that are activated to a lesser extent than in controls.
An Example of Testing Cognitive Th eories at the Brain Level
At present, theories of the cause of SLI that purport a single underlying modular defi cit are divided in terms of the nature of this defi cit, which according to cognitive theory may be either grammar-specifi c or phonological. Th is divergence in cognitive theory can be tested using functional brain imaging. Th e design involves localizing brain regions that are involved in processing a particular type of sentence, namely reversible sentences . In these sentences, the subject and object of the sentence may be swapped or reversed and still produce a meaningful sentence-although the exact meaning of the sentence is changed as a result. For example, in the sentence "the leopard chases the lion," the subject and object of the sentence may be swapped to form the sentence "the lion chases the leopard," which remains a meaningful sentence. Th ese sentences are harder to process than nonreversible sentences, for which swapping the subject and object of the sentence results in a semantically incoherent sentence. For example, swapping the subject and object of the sentence "the mouse eats the cheese" results in a semantically incongruent sentence, "the cheese eats the mouse." right medial frontal cortex and bilaterally in the middle temporal gyrus. However, the fi ndings of this study contrast with an earlier study of young children with SLI carried out by Jancke and colleagues (2007) , which detected regional decreases in white matter rather than increases. Th ese decreases were detected in a network of left hemisphere regions comprising the motor cortex, the premotor cortex, and the superior temporal gyrus.
In sum, present studies indicate that SLI is associated with diff erences in brain structure, which may be linked to deviations from the typical trajectory of cortical development. Diff erences have been observed in multiple brain regions, and although at present there are too few studies from which to draw any consensus, there is the suggestion that these differences may be more prominent in young children with SLI rather than older children. Th is may be because older children with SLI are beginning to overcome their language disorder and are beginning to compensate for their linguistic diffi culties, which may bring about associated changes in local brain structure. In the following section we discuss how functional studies of SLI tentatively reveal diff erences in how language is processed in SLI.
Functional Diff erences
To date, there are only two published functional imaging studies that investigate language processing in SLI. Th is small number of studies in comparison to the number of functional studies of other developmental disorders may be due to the heterogeneity of SLI, combined with the practical diffi culties associated with scanning young children. Th e fi rst published functional study of SLI, carried out by Hugdahl and colleagues (2004) , investigated language processing in fi ve Finnish family members with SLI in comparison to an age-matched sample of six controls. Participants carried out a passive listening task in which they listened to real words, vowel sounds, and pseudo words. Participants with SLI showed smaller and weaker patterns of activation in left hemisphere language regions in comparison to controls. Specifi cally, activations were concentrated within the upper posterior region of the superior temporal gyrus. Th ere was no signifi cant activation in the superior temporal sulcus or the medial temporal gyrus as seen in control participants. Friederici (2006) has suggested that this reduced activation in these regions that are typically engaged in speech perception may be related to the diffi culties individuals with SLI have in decoding the phonological structure of linguistic information. thomas, purser, richardson alternative processing systems in an attempt to compensate for initial diffi culties. Alternatively, these diff erences may represent initial anomalies that normalize as children with SLI begin to overcome their disorder. Th e familial link between diff erences in cortical morphology observed when comparing individuals with SLI with either unaff ected family members or typical individuals suggests that structural deviations of this type may be causally related, since the morphological patterns of gyri and sulci in the brain develop prenatally. However, not all individuals who have deviations in cortical morphology have SLI. Th erefore, these diff erences may indicate a risk factor for language impairment, which when combined with other abnormalities impairs the functional processing of linguistic information. Structural diff erences in the asymmetry of the planum temporale may refl ect an initial diff erence, but variations in this region may also be the outcome of developmental processes. In short, current studies of brain structure in SLI suggest that more than one structural abnormality may be associated with the disorder. However, more research is needed to identify the degree to which these abnormalities are linked with the behavioral profi le of the disorder.
Although current functional imaging evidence in SLI is sparse, there is agreement between studies that individuals with SLI use the same language network as typically developing individuals. However, this network is underactive in individuals with SLI. Th is reduced pattern of functional activation may be linked to underlying structural abnormalities, but may also just refl ect the fact that children are performing more poorly on the language tasks. Th erefore, further studies that match for both chronological age and ability are required in the functional imaging of developmental disorders to establish whether this is the case. For comparison, a study with developmental dyslexics that used chronological age-and ability-matched participants did reveal hypoactivation in comparison to controls even when behavioral performance was controlled for (Hoeft et al., 2007) . Reduced activation in dyslexia may therefore be more strongly associated with the disorder itself rather than due to poorer behavioral performance. If this held for SLI, it would suggest that a network of functional regions is operating suboptimally . Even if this is the case, it is then necessary to address whether each of these regions is impaired, or whether each is struggling with the same impoverished input (e.g., a defi cit in phonological working memory would have negative consequences for other language processing systems Typically developing children and adults alike fi nd reversible sentences harder to process than nonreversible sentences (Herriot, 1969; Kemper & Catlin, 1979; Slobin, 1966; Turner & Rometveit, 1967) , and individuals with SLI show a pronounced diffi culty in processing these sentences (van der Lely & Harris, 1990) . By comparing functional activations produced while comprehending reversible and nonreversible sentences, it is possible to identify regions specifi c to the processing of reversible sentences. Th ese are then candidate regions for defi cits that would produce impairments in SLI. Are these regions involved in grammar or in phonology? Richardson and colleagues (2010) succeeded in identifying a region that showed increased activation during the processing of reversible sentences in both typically developing children and adults. Th is region was on the left temporal-parietal boundary, which bridges a lateral region of the left posterior superior temporal gyrus and the neighboring inferior parietal region. Th rough the use of additional tasks carried out by the same participants, Richardson and colleagues were then able to localize this activation as being associated with phonological processing. In contrast to expectations, there was no additional activation for reversible sentences in comparison to nonreversible sentences in the left inferior frontal gyrus, which is typically associated with syntactic processing (Caplan et al., 1999 (Caplan et al., , 2001 Cooke et al., 2001) . Th e authors suggest that in the normal case, the processing of reversible sentences places additional demands upon phonological working memory. Th e fi nding implies that developmental anomalies in this area would provide one causal pathway that would explain why children with SLI experience exaggerated diffi culties with reversible sentences. Of course, in SLI, these diffi culties may have a syntactic or semantic cause; the current data are only suggestive that a temporal-parietal anomaly aff ecting phonological processing might be sufficient to explain sentence-level diffi culties in SLI.
Structural and Functional Diff erences in SLI: Implications for Modularity
Th e multiple structural diff erences identifi ed in SLI may at fi rst suggest that a modular causal theory is unlikely. However, although multiple differences in brain structure have been detected, it is important to consider that some of these diff erences may be a consequence of the disorder rather than being causes of it. For instance, diff erences in gray matter or white matter in a given region may be due to the use and subsequent development of or regulation of one brain network, but that brain network is then involved in producing multiple cognitive processes. Last, a given set of genes may be involved in the development and/or regulation of multiple brain networks, and each brain network may be involved in producing multiple cognitive processes. Th e last of these possibilities would make it least likely that there could be very specifi c cognitive outcomes via discrete genetic diff erences. argued that on current evidence, it is indeed the last of these three options that seems most likely to relate genes and brain. For example, our review of the brain basis of SLI pointed to the involvement of multiple brain areas. Moreover, the candidate genes that have been implicated to date in the causes of developmental disorders such as dyslexia and SLI do not appear to have particularly specifi c functions but to be involved in the developmental placement of neurons, the general functioning of neurons, the signaling between these neurons, or producing experience-dependent change in connectivity. Although to date we have relatively little defi nitive knowledge about the domain specifi city of genetic infl uences on the development of cortex, the mechanisms able to deliver innate modularity in high-level cognition have yet to be found (see, e.g., Marcus & Rabagliati, 2006, and , for discussion on this point). If the mechanisms aren't forthcoming, the likelihood of innate high-level modules will have to be reduced, whatever the superfi cial plausibility of the evolutionary accounts supporting their origin, and accounts of developmental defi cits that invoke such modules will have to be reconsidered.
We are left with a conundrum of sorts. Some developmental disorders do exhibit uneven cognitive profi les. Th at is, in many cases, individuals with disorders will possess some skills that fall within the normal range for their chronological age, or in cases of learning disability, in the normal range for the individual's overall mental age. Conversely, even where all abilities fall behind chronological-age expectations, some abilities may be more aff ected than others. Where does the unevenness come from?
Before this question can be answered, we need to know exactly what degree of unevenness needs to be explained. We saw in the section on WS that the degree of unevenness within abilities can be greater than expected, with fractionation continuing down inside modules as traditionally constructed. We saw that areas of apparent strength may be delivered by atypical underlying processes. And we saw that that rely upon this resource). Here we see echoes of the same issues we encountered at the end of the section on cognitive-level theories of modularity.
In sum, to determine whether a modular causal account is applicable to SLI, it is essential to establish how diff erences in brain structure and function are associated with increasingly typical or atypical behavioral performance. At present, too little is known about the brain basis of SLI in order to establish whether the behavioral profi le of this disorder has a single cause or multiple underlying causes. However, given the heterogeneous nature of this disorder, it may be diffi cult to envisage a single underlying cause that accounts for both linguistic and nonlinguistic characteristics, although this may still be possible if parts of the language processing system aff ected in SLI are also engaged in nonlinguistic processing. Where multiple regions are held to account for SLI, we must account for why the defi cits should co-occur, and how they are linked to the genetic basis of the disorder.
Th e Future
Th e future of modularity in the study of developmental disorders depends, to some extent, on which sense of the term prevails: the weaker sense, implying little more than functional specialization of processing components, or the stronger sense, implying as much as domain-specifi c, encapsulated, high-level, innate cognitive mechanisms. What is most often lacking in the fi eld at present is explanation of the nature of the developmental process even if the cognitive system is postulated to contain modules. To understand how development can go wrong so that it produces uneven cognitive profi les, we must also understand how development works in the normal case.
We saw that the idea of modularity is deployed in several fi elds, but that in psychology, there are additional complications. Th e mind is implemented in the brain: Do the mind and brain exhibit the same type or degree of modularity? Th ere is, in fact, a further complication, one that we have alluded to but skirted around: What is the relation of genes to the brain level? identifi ed three possible relations. First, a given set of genes may be involved in the development and/or regulation of one brain network, and the brain network may be involved in producing one cognitive process. Th is is the chain that makes it seem most likely that genetic variation or mutation could target a single cognitive process. Second, a given set of genes may be involved in the development and/ thomas, purser, richardson we have considered in less detail (genetics) or not at all. Two important complementary methods for understanding uneven cognitive profi les are developmental neurobiology and computational modeling. Here are a couple of examples. Developmental neurobiology has revealed how in the developmental disorder PKU, insuffi cient tyrosine in the blood has a diff erential impact on executive functions despite the fact that the entire brain receives too little tyrosine. Tyrosine is one of the 20 amino acids that are used by cells to synthesize proteins. Th e dopamine neurons that project to prefrontal cortex (the brain area responsible for executive functions) have higher rates of dopamine turnover than other brain regions and, because tyrosine is a metabolic precursor of dopamine, frontal systems are sensitive to modest reductions in tyrosine that are too small to aff ect the rest of the brain (Diamond & Amso, 2008) . Second, using mouse models, Matzel, Babiarz, Townsend, Grossman, and Grumet (2008) found that a NRCAM gene knockout mouse that was unable to produce neuronal cell-adhesion molecule (NRCAM) showed impairments in only one of fi ve learning tasks tested compared to normal mice (namely passive avoidance but not Lashley maze, odor discrimination, spatial water maze, or fear conditioning). Despite the widespread involvement of NRCAM in cell adhesion and migration, axonal growth, guidance, target recognition, and synapse formation across the whole brain, once more the result was an uneven profi le. In this mouse model, NRCAM did not appear to play a central role in the regulation of general cognitive abilities, only in regulating impulsivity.
Computational models are also an essential tool to further our understanding of how atypical processing constraints can alter developmental trajectories and functional specialization. Implementation is required for the implications of (atypical) development in complex systems to become clear. For example, Baughman and Th omas (2008) used a dynamic systems framework to capture how an initially focal defi cit might spread across a cognitive system during development, depending on the degree of modularity present in the architecture of the system. Th omas and Karmiloff - investigated the precise processing constraints that would reproduce patterns of developmental defi cits in a particular aspect of language development. And Th omas and Richardson (2006) explored the computational conditions that might lead to the emergence of atypical modular structures in distributed processing systems. uneven cognitive profi les may change across development. Similarly, we are not yet at a stage where we know the degree of atypicality of underlying brain structures in disorders, let alone their consequences for function. In the section on SLI, we saw that multiple structural diff erences have been identifi ed in this heterogeneous disorder, but that language function appeared to involve underactivation of the same network of brain areas as in normal development. However, little work had been done to explore the brain activity associated with behavior in areas of apparent strength in SLI, such as nonverbal skills.
On the plus side, it is increasingly apparent what questions we need to have answers to, and the methods required to answer them. For a given disorder, we need sensitive measures of cognition across both areas of strength and areas of weakness, and these data must span development. We need similar data corresponding to the activity of functional brain networks. We need to know how genes infl uence the initial functional diff erentiation of the brain in the development of the fetus, how much the initial functions of the regions change as they acquire content through experience, and how much scope regions have to change their eventual specialization through experience. We need to know what impact genetic mutations or genetic variation have on this pattern of initial diff erentiation and experience-dependent specialization, the level at which these constraints operate (sensorimotor vs. high-level cognition), and the specifi city of genetic infl uences to the content of each cognitive domain. For example, for SLI, do genetic infl uences target language-specifi c computational operations or generic computational resources in regions with input/output connectivity appropriate to integrate auditory, motor, and multimodal information? We need a better understanding of developmental interactions between diff erent cognitive and brain systems that permit compensation or lead to defi cit spread. We need to understand what diff erences lead to defi cits compared to delays in particular cognitive abilities. And perhaps most importantly, for each disorder, we need to know the developmentally important moments to target intervention in order to stand the best chance of defl ecting developmental trajectories toward more adaptive outcomes.
Today, we already have many of the scientifi c methods required to answer these questions. We have considered two of these methods in some detail, behavioral and brain imaging techniques. Others with the environment: children who are fi nding it hard to read tend to read less, and so gain less practice in learning to read.
In all likelihood, the genes responsible for this type of cognitive variation have been in the gene pool for a long, long time. If you can only represent words in larger chunks of sound, this won't particularly aff ect your oral skills. Maybe you will name pictures a few milliseconds more slowly, a subtle diff erence at best. Before the invention of reading, individuals with these genes would to all intents and purposes have appeared to have an even cognitive profi le .
It is problematic to have these chunky phonological representations only when you need to link the component sounds of words to component written letters (or groups of letters). And it is particularly problematic only when the relationship between component sounds and letter clusters is a tricky one, like it is in English. Where the relationship is simpler, like in Italian, no particular problem in learning to read emerges in these individuals. In other words, the uneven cognitive profi le observed in dyslexia is the result of cultural innovation to learn particular tasks (reading English) for which some proportion of the population won't have the right sorts of speech representations. Th ey won't have the right sorts of representations under normal circumstances, but this does not rule out the possibility that the right behavioral intervention at the right age may provide them with phonological representations appropriate for learning to read-genetic predispositions do not inevitably determine behavioral outcomes. One solution would be to simplify the spelling of English. If our nostalgia for the language of Shakespeare could be overcome (among other obstacles), the infl uence of the "genes for dyslexia" on our reading behavior would disappear and the even cognitive profi le of individuals with these genotypes would be restored.
Summary
Developmental disorders may be split into • disorders of a known genetic origin and disorders that are defi ned on behavioral grounds. Uneven cognitive profi les can be found in the presence of learning disability (e.g., WS) or in its absence (e.g., SLI).
Modularity is the idea that a system is made • up of functionally specialized parts. It has been proposed that uneven profi les may be explained in Together these additional methods have produced at least two possible answers to why most developmental disorders exhibit some similarities to the typical developmental profi le. First, some brain systems (and cognitive domains that supervene upon them) may be diff erentially sensitive to certain genetic factors even though the genetic infl uences are brain-wide. Some domains may indeed be (initially) less impaired than others. Second, the genes that infl uence the development of the largest-scale constraints in the brain, such as the broad wiring pattern of the cortex that involves its inputs and outputs, may not vary in disorders that produce viable embryos (see Brock, 2007, and Richardson, 2006) . If the inputs and outputs to the systems are the same, the information that shapes the development of mental representations will be similar. Cognitive profi les may share similarities because in most cases, typically and atypically developing children are trying to master the same sorts of tasks in their subjective physical and social environments using the same sorts of information, even if the details of the mechanisms with which they try to solve these problems may diff er.
We fi nish by returning to a puzzle that we raised earlier, concerning the origin of the uneven cognitive profi le observed in dyslexia. How is it possible for a selective defi cit for reading to be inherited when reading itself is a recent cultural invention? A sketch of an answer to this question will serve to give a fl avor of what future explanations of developmental disorders might look like (see Mareschal et al., 2007 , for more details of this account).
Th e reading system in adults is evidence that practice in the life of an individual can wire together a new high-level cognitive system, in this case one that integrates an appropriate substrate from the visual system with the spoken language system. Th e emergence of the reading system relies on integration between multiple systems, including the processing of spoken forms of words, written form of words, and word meanings. Weaknesses in the development of any these skills could in principle make it harder to learn to read, so we might expect there to be diff erent varieties of reading disability, consistent with the observed heterogeneity in this disorder. Most children with dyslexia appear to have problems representing the component sounds of words (that is, breaking words up into phonemes). While this problem may be the initial cause, subsequently there are likely to be complex interactions thomas, purser, richardson strengths and weaknesses found in typically developing children?
What are the genetic eff ects on early brain • development that contribute to uneven cognitive profi les?
To what extent does the subsequent process • of cognitive development change the nature of the even profi le, by spreading defi cits via interactions or attenuating them via compensation?
To what extent can exposure to particular • environments (such as interventions) remove weaknesses in uneven profi les or build on strengths?
How will an increasing understanding of • brain function from neuroimaging methods inform our understanding of the origins of developmental defi cits? Notes 1 . A standardized test is a psychological test that has been given to a large number of children and adults so that the range of performance at each age can be established. Th e performance of any given individual can then be compared to the standardization sample to see whether this individual falls within the normal range for his or her age. Intelligence tests are usually made up of a battery of standardized subtests that examine diff erent abilities (e.g., language, memory, attention, visuospatial skills, motor skills, and so forth).
2 . Th e idea that modularity is a restriction on causal scope works as follows. At the fi nest grain of functional elements in the system, some clusters of elements interact only locally with nearby elements, whereas other elements also interact with more distant elements. Th e clusters of only locally interacting elements are viewed as the modules, while the elements with longer causal links are viewed as the connections between modules. Th is formulation allows for a graded concept of modularity rather than an all-or-none concept, where the degree of modularity depends on the distribution of ranges of causal interactions that the elements exhibit.
3 . Th e terminology "a gene for X ," where X is some behavior, has become increasingly common in the media, but also to some extent in behavioral genetics and cognitive neuroscience. Within science, the term is intended as shorthand and its meaning is fairly specifi c. It means that having versus not having some particular gene variant explains a statistically signifi cant amount of the variation in behavior X . Th e amount of variation explained, although statistically reliable, is typically rather small, meaning that many other genes must also be involved in producing variation in behavior X , as well as environmental factors.
terms of damage to one or more specialized parts of the cognitive system.
For developmental disorders, this idea is • controversial, because it is unclear when functional specialization occurs in development. Explanations are complicated by the fact that the notion of modularity may apply diff erently to cognitive and neural levels of description.
Four types of modular explanations of • developmental defi cits can be discerned, which place diff erent degrees of emphasis on the developmental process, and which predict more or less selective behavioral defi cits.
WS is an example of a disorder of known • genetic origin demonstrating an uneven cognitive profi le as well as learning disability. Research has demonstrated no straightforward modular explanation of the behavioral defi cits found in the disorder. We considered language development and face recognition as examples of recent cognitive-level explanations in WS.
SLI is an example of a behaviorally defi ned • disorder, where some researchers argue that the language system alone (or some subcomponent within it) fails to develop normally. Other researchers appeal to more domain-general processing defi cits that exert a greater eventual impact on language.
SLI off ers an opportunity to consider • how the idea of modularity might apply at the brain level, via recent fi ndings from structural and fMRI. Brain-based views of functional specialization are inconsistent with cognitive views in two ways: multiple brain regions are typically engaged in a given cognitive task, and each brain region is frequently engaged by multiple tasks.
Individuals with SLI show subtle and • inconsistent diff erences in the structure of their brains, but there is as yet limited evidence on functional diff erences. Current evidence indicates that similar language regions become active, but to a reduced extent.
Th e future study of developmental disorders • involves convergent evidence from multiple methodologies and disciplines, including behavioral testing, brain imaging, genetics, and computational modeling.
Questions for Future Research
Are uneven cognitive profi les in behaviorally • defi ned disorders on a continuum with the
